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Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost
importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are
connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the
success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous
emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public
cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of
correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is
disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can
thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the
coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.
Introduction
Not only are our social interactions limited and thus best described not by well-mixed models but rather by models
entailing networks1, 2, 3, it is also a fact that these networks are often interconnected and indeed very much
interdependent4, 6, 7, 8. From the World economy to Google Circles, this interdependence cannot be denied and is all
but absent, and in fact it is easily observable. Not necessarily so on the basis of actual links between the networks, which
arguably could be the most hidden and difficult to identify feature of such systems, but much more so based on the
impact actions in one network will have on the behavior in another network. Several examples are provided in9, which
demonstrate vividly that we live in a strongly interconnected World. More specifically, seminal works on interdependent
networks have shown that even seemingly irrelevant changes in one network can have catastrophic and very much
unexpected consequence in another network4, 5. Since the evolution of cooperation in human societies also proceeds
on such interdependent networks, it is thus of significant interest to determine to what extent the interdependence
influences the outcome of evolutionary games.
Preceding works concerning evolutionary games on individual networks and graphs, as reviewed comprehensively in1,
10, 11
, provide a stimulating starting point for explorations on interdependent networks12, 13, 14. The discovery of
network reciprocity due to Nowak and May15, which demonstrated that the aggregation of cooperators into compact
clusters can protect them against invading defectors even in the realm of the most challenging prisoner's dilemma game,
launched a spree of research activity aimed at understanding the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.
Methods of statistical physics in particular16, have proven very valuable for this task, as evidenced by the seminal
studies of the evolution of cooperation on small-world17, 18, scale-free19, 20, coevolving21, 22, hierarchical23 and
bipartite networks24, to name only a few representative examples. Based on these studies it is now established that
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heterogeneous connections promote cooperation in all main social dilemmas20, and that this is a very robust
evolutionary outcome25, although not immune to the normalization of payoffs26, 27, 28, 29 and targeted removal of
nodes30. In fact, heterogeneity in general, not just in terms of players having different degree within a network, has
proven to be very effective in maintaining high levels of cooperation in the population31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39.
Moreover, many coevolutionary rules11 have been introduced that may generate such states spontaneously40, 41, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48
. Adding to this the discovered relevance of the population being structured rather than well-mixed for the
effectiveness of reward49, 50, punishment51, 52, 53, selection pressure54, and bargaining55, 56, 57, 58, it is beyond doubt
that the added complexity of the interdependence between networks will lead to the discovery of fascinating new insights
concerning how and why we so often choose socially responsible actions over defection, despite the fact that
large-scale social experiments suggest otherwise59.
Here we wish to contribute to the subject by studying the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent
networks. In order to focus on the effects that are predominantly due to the interdependence, we consider the square
lattice as an elementary interaction network and an evolutionary game that is governed by group interactions, namely the
spatial public goods game60. The usage of this setup is motivated by our desire to minimize other effects that could
stem from network complexity or pairwise interactions. Nevertheless, as we will argue when presenting the results and
the newly discovered mechanism of interdependent network reciprocity, our findings should apply to many other social
scenarios as well. In general, within the realm of evolutionary games, it is most natural to assume that the
interconnectedness will not allow direct strategy exchanges between the networks, but rather affect the utility function of
players which influences the strategy imitation probability within a network12. While traditionally the utility is considered to
be the payoff of a player as received from the games played with its interaction partners, staging the game on
interdependent networks opens up the possibility of alternative, possibly interdependent formulations of utility. A general
example is when the payoff of a player is not just due to the games with its neighbors in the current network, but also due
to its involvement in another network. Two individuals with strong ties but working in separate environments, or the
relation between two companies of the same group but in different countries, can be characterized this way. We make
use of these possibilities and propose a simple network-symmetric formulation of utility based on the payoff of player in
the first network, as well as the average payoffs of its neighbors on both the original and the second network. While this
formulation is not intended to model any specific scenario, it captures relevantly the essence of interdependent utilities.
Notably, considering the payoffs of neighbors provides a natural coupling within a network, which can then be compared
with the consequence of coupling between networks. Importantly, as the definition of utility is symmetric with respect to
the two networks, there is no master-slave relation between them. As we will show, this setup leads us to the observation
of interdependent network reciprocity. In particular, if related players on both networks aggregate into compact
cooperative domains, then this form of reciprocity is much more powerful than traditional network reciprocity on an
isolated network. On the other hand, even if some cooperators aggregate into a compact domain in one network, they
ultimately fail to survive in the absence of similarly aggregated partners in the other network. Hence the term
interdependent network reciprocity.
Results
We first present results for α = β (see Methods for the description of the model and parameters), in which case the
focus is mainly on the transition of importance from individual payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors in the
evaluation of utility. Naturally, as β increases the interdependence between the two networks grows too (see Eq. 2), but it
is impossible to attribute the reported effects unequivocally either to the growing influence of group payoffs or to the
growing interdependence. As results presented in Fig. 1 show, simultaneously increasing both α and β continuously
lowers the minimally required multiplication factor r that is needed for cooperator to survive. What is more, the span of r
where cooperators and defectors coexist shrinks too, ultimately leading also to an ever-faster arrival to the pure C phase
as r increases further. More precisely, the minimally required r/G drops from 0.748 for α = β = 0 to r/G = 0.33 for α = β =
0.45, and correspondingly, the required r/G for complete cooperator dominance drops from r/G = 1.09 to just r/G = 0.35.
This is certainly impressive and motivating for wanting to understand the mechanism behind the remarkable promotion of
public cooperation. Even before further results are presented, however, it is clear that the transition of weight from
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individual payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors in determining the utility of each player plays an important
role. In particular, the transition magnifies the benefit of C – C coupling on both networks, yet this effect alone would be
unable to improve the viability of cooperators to such an extent as reported in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Shifting weight from individual payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors in the evaluation of
utility promotes the evolution of public cooperation.
Depicted is the stationary fraction of cooperators ρ  on both lattices in dependence on the normalized multiplication factor r/G for
different α = β values, as denoted in the figure legend. Due to the payoff-coupling within and between networks, there is a
remarkable drop of critical r/G values that are required for cooperators to survive and dominate on both networks. Results were
obtained by means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations using 2 × L × L = 2 × 300 × 300 system size and 2 × 105 MC steps.
Averages were determined from the last 104 MC steps.
It is therefore of interest to decouple the impact of α and β by eliminating the α = β restrain, as presented in Fig. 2,
where contour plots encode the stationary fraction of cooperators ρ  for three different values of r/G. Regardless of the
multiplication factor, it can be observed that at any given value of β, increasing α will elevate ρ . Note that increasing α
simply elevates the relevance of the payoffs of nearest neighbors on the expense of individual payoffs on any given
network, without modifying the level of interdependence between them. The impact of β at any given α, however, is less
clear-cut. Note that increasing β, however, also elevates the relevance of the payoffs of nearest neighbors on the
expense of individual payoffs, but on separate networks, thus increasing the level of interdependence between them. In
general, increasing β at a fixed value of α also elevates ρ  levels, thus suggesting that an increase in the
interdependence of the utility function also promotes public cooperation, similarly as the increase of α at any given β. Yet
the efficiency of increasing β depends much more on α than vice versa. For low values of α increasing β has a much
more marginal impact than if increasing β at high values of α. This difference in impact also grows as r/G decreases.
Both these facts indicate that network reciprocity on each individual network is crucial for higher β to take effect, as both
lower values of α and r/G make it increasingly difficult for cooperators to form compact domains.
Figure 2: Shifting weight from individual payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors promotes the evolution
of cooperation, but it is important whether the shift entails the average payoffs of neighbors on the host network
(α) or the average payoffs of neighbors on the other, interdependent network (β).
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Depicted are contour plots showing the stationary fraction of cooperators ρ  in dependence on both α and β for r/G = 0.4 (left),
0.7 (middle), and 0.8 (right). Increasing α at any given β promotes the evolution of cooperation. The same is true vice versa, only
that the positive effect depends much more on α and r/G, thus highlighting the importance of an intact network reciprocity on
each individual network for increasing β to work. Details of Monte Carlo simulations are the same as described in Fig. 1.
Having then established the relevance of traditional network reciprocity on each individual network, it is next instructive to
monitor the evolution of cooperation separately on the two networks. In order to do so, we first examine how the fraction
of C – C and D – D pairs varies separately on network A and B for a characteristic combination of game parameters, as
presented in Fig. 3. Here P  and P  denote the fraction of the related pair configurations within and between networks,
respectively. Accordingly, P (C,C) is the probability to find a C – C pair in any given network, while P (C,C) is the
probability to find a C – C link between the two networks. Besides the initial fall of cooperators before the eventual rise,
which is the hallmark signature indicating the spontaneous emergence of spatial reciprocity, it is important to note just
how synchronized the rise (fall) and fall (rise) of D – D (C – C) pairs on the two networks is. There is only a small
quantitative difference inferable, but otherwise both cooperators and defectors on the two networks share completely the
same fate.
Figure 3: Cooperators and defectors on the two interdependent networks share exactly the same fate during the
course of evolution, i.e., as soon as the density of cooperator (defector) pairs starts decreasing (increasing) on
one network, the same happens on the other network.
In the legend P  and P  mark the corresponding pair configuration probabilities within (internal) and between (external) networks,
respectively. The evolution is completely synchronous, with quantitative differences emerging only due to the applied relatively
C
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small value of β. Notably, for β → 0.5 the difference would be virtually none. Parameter values used were: r/G = 0.7, α = 0.15,
and β = 0.5, at L = 300.
The question that now poses itself is just how important the synchrony of the evolutionary process on the two
interdependent networks is. As evidenced by the results presented in Fig. 4, the importance can hardly be overstated. If
we prevent the spontaneous formation of cooperative domains in one of the networks by applying a permanent mixing
of strategies, then this will negatively influence the evolution of cooperation in the other (undisturbed) network as well. On
the latter, the cooperators will die out despite the fact that the coupling within the network is still functioning via nonzero
α, and that thus the evolution of cooperation ought to be supported on this undisturbed network. As can be observed,
this intervention on one of the networks will not only prevent the emergence of synchronized evolution on the two
networks, but will also result in full defection in the undisturbed network in spite of the fact that the two networks are not
physically connected (the corresponding evolution in the unperturbed network is denoted by “disturbed” in Fig. 4). For
comparison, we also plot the evolution in the same network when the emergence of parallel evolution was not disturbed
(denoted by “free” in Fig. 4). As the “free” line shows, cooperators can eventually spread widely even at parameter
values where traditional single-network reciprocity would fail completely.
Figure 4: Mixing the distribution of players in one of the two networks disrupts the synchronous evolution of the
two strategies, which has dire consequences for the fate of cooperation on the other network, despite the fact
that the coupling of payoffs within the network is still significant.
The evolution of cooperation in the latter, measured by the density of cooperators, is denoted dashed red. For comparison, solid
green line shows the time dependence in the same network while the strategy evolution is not disturbed in the other network. This
experiment highlights that while traditional network reciprocity alone can be inefficient, the chances of cooperators improve
dramatically if interdependent network reciprocity is allowed to take effect. The applied system size was 2 × 200 × 200 at r/G =
0.7, α = 0.15, and β = 0.5.
These results lead us to the coining of the term “interdependent network reciprocity”, simply because if network
reciprocity fails on one network, it will inevitably fail also on the other network. If it remains intact on both, however, and if
the interdependence via the utility function is sufficiently strong to initialize spontaneous coordination between the two
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networks, then interdependent network reciprocity will strongly outperform traditional single-network reciprocity, in fact
leading to much higher levels of public cooperation, as evidenced in Figs. 1 and 2. The mechanism of interdependent
network reciprocity can be demonstrated most beautifully by means of characteristic snapshots of the two
interdependent networks as obtained from a prepared initial state. Figure 5 shows that only the one circular cooperative
domain is able to survive the initial onslaught of defectors, namely the one that is initially present on both networks, but
not the other two which are initially present on only one network. Notably, other cooperators that are initially distributed
uniformly at random, and which could potentially be saved by traditional single-network reciprocity, die out fast too. Thus,
only those cooperators that can make immediate use of interdependent network reciprocity survive and eventually
spread across both networks.
Figure 5: Direct observation of interdependent network reciprocity.
From left to right, panels (a)–(d) depict the evolution of cooperation in one network, while panels (e)–(h) show the same for the
other network. Starting from a prepared initial state, only those circular cooperative domains that are initially present on both
networks, and which can therefore make immediate use of interdependent network reciprocity, survive and eventually spread
across both networks. Cooperators that are initially distributed uniformly at random, as well as clustered cooperators present on
one but not the other network, surrender under the evolutionary pressure from defectors already at the early stages of evolution.
The applied system size was 2 × 200 × 200 at r/G = 0.66, α = 0.15, and β = 0.5. Snapshots were taken at t = 0, 100, 500 and
10000 MC steps.
Lastly it is of interest to elaborate on the generality of the identified interdependent network reciprocity. To do so, we
consider an alternative setup entailing three symmetrically interdependent networks with the governing utility function
being
Here x′ and x″ denote the related players of player x in the corresponding networks. In this way every network is
connected with two other networks in a symmetric way, without any master-slave preferences. As in the originally studied
model, strategy imitation is allowed only between players residing on the same network, but never between players from
different networks. As results presented in Fig. 6 show, the impact of different α and β values is qualitatively the same as
reported in Fig. 2 for the two-network setup. In particular, it can be observed that at any given value of β, increasing α will
elevate ρ , while increasing β at a fixed value of α also elevates ρ  levels, but it requires a threshold value of α to be
surpassed for the interdependent network reciprocity to become really effective. Altogether, these results indicate clearly
that the spontaneous emergence of coordination and subsequent synchronization of the evolutionary process is
possible also if more than two networks are interdependent. Further on the generality of interdependent network
reciprocity, we remind that the outcome of public goods games is in general independent of the interaction topology60,
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and therefore a similar impact can be expected also if the topology of individual networks is different from the square
lattice. Moreover, since social dilemma games governed by pairwise interactions were recently also found to be
susceptible to the “wisdom of group” effect61, we argue that interdependent network reciprocity should be observable
straightforwardly by them as well. More challenging setups, which would be of interest to study more accurately in the
future, would entail determining to what degree the network topology of each individual network forming the
interdependent system is allowed to differ before for interdependent network reciprocity to remain intact.
Figure 6: Interdependent network reciprocity works also one more than two symmetrically interdependent
networks.
Like for two networks, for three interdependent networks shifting weight from individual payoffs to average payoffs of nearest
neighbors also promotes the evolution of cooperation, but it is important whether the shift entails the average payoffs of
neighbors on the host network (α) or the average payoffs of neighbors on the other, interdependent network (β). For
interdependent network reciprocity to work best, a threshold value of α ≈ 0.17 needs to be surpassed. The applied system size
was 3 × L × L = 3 × 400 × 400 and 5 × 105 MC steps were used, while the value of r/G = 0.7 was the same as used in the
middle panel of Fig. 2, which thus also serves as a comparison reference.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent networks that
are subject to interconnectedness by means of a network-symmetric definition of utility. Strategy imitation has been
allowed only between players residing on the same network, but not between players on different networks. We have
shown first that, in general, increasing the relevance of the average payoff of nearest neighbors on the expense of
individual payoffs in the evaluation of utility increases the survivability of cooperators. More importantly, however, we
have shown that while doing this for the coupling between individual and group payoffs on a given network simply
reinforces network reciprocity, applying the same coupling of payoffs between networks has a much more interesting
and in fact unexpected outcome. In particular, we have identified the spontaneous emergence of the so-called
interdependent network reciprocity. The later implies that if cooperative players on network A aggregate into compact
domains while the corresponding players on network B fail to do so (or vice versa due to the network-symmetric
definition of utility), the mechanism of network reciprocity will ultimately fail on both networks. On the other hand, if
players on network A aggregate and the corresponding players on network B do too, then the evolution of cooperation
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will be promoted much stronger than based on traditional single-network reciprocity alone. At this point it is important to
note that players between the networks are not physically connected, nor are they allowed to imitate strategy from one
another. The coordination of clustering of cooperators on both networks is a spontaneous process that is thus brought
about solely by the interdependence of utility. We have shown the mechanism of interdependent network reciprocity to
be robust against the number of interdependent networks, and we have provided arguments in favor of robustness
against variations of the structure of each individual network, as well against the type of the governing evolutionary game
played. Overall, our research indicates that the interdependence of interaction networks can be exploited effectively to
promote public cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, although this is subject to warranting
undisturbed coordination of the distribution of strategies on the two networks, which in turn requires a sufficiently strong
interdependence of utility.
Methods
The public goods game on both networks is staged on a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where
players are arranged into overlapping groups of size G = 5. Every player is thus surrounded by its k = G − 1 nearest
neighbors and is a member in g = G different groups. Initially each player on site x in network A and on site x′ in network
B is designated either as a cooperator C or defector D with equal probability. The accumulation of payoffs P  and P  on
both networks follows the same standard procedure. Namely, in each group cooperators contribute 1 to the public good
while defectors contribute nothing. The sum of contributions is subsequently multiplied by the factor r > 1, reflecting the
synergetic effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount is equally shared amongst the G group members. In each
group the payoff obtained is  on network A and  on network B, while the total amount received in all the groups is
thus  and  .
While the two networks are not physically connected, interdependence is introduced via the utility function
where 〈P 〉 and 〈P 〉 are the average payoffs of all four neighbors of players x and x′ on their host lattices, respectively.
It is important to note that this definition is network-symmetric. The evaluation of U  is identical if the indexes (′) for the
two networks are switched, and thus there is no master-slave relation between them. The later was considered
previously in12, but it constitutes and entirely different setup. In accordance with the proposed symmetric definition of
utility as given by Eq. 2, increasing α and/or β, within the limitations of the condition (α + β) < 1, puts more emphasis on
the payoffs of the neighbors, while at the same time decreasing the relevance of individual payoffs. As expected, larger
values of α promote cooperation, but the consequence of increasing β is hardly foreseeable as there is no direct
information exchange between the networks via strategy imitation. Setting β = 0 decouples the two networks and more
specifically, at α = β = 0 we regain the traditional spatial public goods game on both square lattices, where, as reported
in60, cooperators die out if the multiplication factor r decreases below a threshold, depending also on the uncertainty
governing the strategy adoptions K (see Eq. 3 below). For K = 0.5, which we will use throughout this work without loss of
generality, the critical value is r/G = 0.748.
Following the determination of utilities of players according to Eq. 2, strategy imitation is possible only between nearest
neighbors on any given lattice, but never between players residing on different networks. We emphasize that this
restrain, in addition to the network-symmetric formulation of utility, are the two key considerations of the present setup.
Accordingly, on network A player x can adopt the strategy s  of one of its randomly chosen nearest neighbors y with a
probability determined by the Fermi function
where the utility U  of player y is evaluated identically as for player x. The probability of strategy invasion from player y′
to player x′ on network B is determined likewise, only that utilities  and  are used. Simulations of the model were
x x′
x x′
x′
y
y
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performed by means of a random sequential update, where each player on both networks had a chance to pass its
strategy once on average during a Monte Carlo (MC) step. The linear system size was varied from L = 100 to 600 in
order to avoid finite size effects, and the equilibration required up to 105 MC steps.
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